The operator of a motor vehicle is required to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others. Since it would be impossible in all circumstances to state what the motorist must do to exercise reasonable  care, the concept of the reasonably prudent person standard was adopted. The motorist must exercise that degree of care while operating his vehicle which the reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. The reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. The reasonably prudent person will:

A motorist does not have the exclusive right to use the road. The motorist must reasonably anticipate dangers. The rule of common law is that a person must use his own property so as not to cause damage or injury to others. The duty of care will vary with each circumstance and the degree of danger involved.

The basic premise which must be kept in mind is that there is no liability merely because someone is hurt or property damaged. The motorist would not be liable if he was exercise of due care. A violation of the rules of the road which results in injury or damage to others is negligence. The violator in his case will be subject to liability. However, the motorist who is in compliance with the rules of the road will not necessarily be free from exercise care for the safety of others. Even though the motorist has not violated any of the rules of the road, he can be deemed to be negligent if he fails to meet his duty of care.

For example, if the road is covered with ice and a safe speed under these particular weather conditions would not be inexcess of 20-25 miles per hour. The motorist who drives at 45 miles per hour, well within the speed limit, and has an accident, would be operating his vehicle in a negligent manner. The motorist will be subject to liability if his negligence is the proximate cause of the accident.

The motorist is also charged with knowledge of the rules of the road and knowledge of the speed limit applicable to the road he is traveling. If the motorist is not familiar with either one of the above, this not excuse his violation. For example: Assume the speed limit is 35 miles per hour on a particular street. The motorist does not know the speed limit and did not observe the posted speed limit. If the motorist exceeds the speed limit, knowingly or unknowingly, he is charged with operating his vehicle in a negligent manner and he is subject to liability if his negligence is the proximate cause of the accident.

The rights granted by the rules of the road are not absolute. The rights granted are subject to the motorist's overall duty to exercise care for a red light and the light turns green, the motorist does not have to proceed. If traffic or pedestrians are in the intersection, he must wait before proceeding.

In the final analysis, whether or not there was aviolation of a rule of the road (even though enacted into a statute), the reasonably prudent person standard must be applied to determine the presence of negligence.

The automobile does have a potential for danger. The auto however, is not a dangerous instrumentality. This is one of the circumstances which the reasonable prudent person must recognize in determining what care is to be taken to avoid foreseeable harm.

The operator of a motor vehicle must be a fit driver, operate a safe vehicle, keep his vehicle under control and look out for others

If a motorist is not physically or mentally fit to drive an automobile, it is negligent for him to drive an automobile. If a person has a condition or disease which may cause him to become unconscious he is liable for any harm which he causes.

If a motorist is blinded by the sun and continues to drive his automobile at the same speed and strikes a child, he will be negligent as a matter of law.

If a motorist falls asleep and is unable to show any justification for falling asleep at the wheel, he would be negligent as a matter of law. This should not be confused with fainting, shocks or heart attacks which occur at the wheel. The motorist would not be negligent if he has no reason to know that he might be subject to such incapacity.

For example, a motorist suffers a heart attack at the wheel. The car goes out of control and injures two pedestrians on the sidewalk. The motorist had no previous knowledge of his heart condition nor had this manifested itself in any way. The risk of harm to the pedestrians could not have been foreseen and the motorist would have no liability to them.

Intoxication does not necessarily charge a driver with liability for an accident. If a motorist is driving his car properly, observing the law of the road, and a collision occurs without any fault or negligence on his part, there can be no recovery against him even though he may be intoxicated.

Obviously, his intoxication furnishes no excuse for his negligent operation of an automobile. An intoxicated person is held to the same degree of care as a sober person in the same circumstances and is liable for injuries resulting from a collision proximately caused by his negligence.

The motorist must maintain his vehicle in a reasonable safe condition. He is negligent if he travels on a public highway in a vehicle which he knows or has reason to know is unsafe. For example, a person is negligent if he drives on a public highway with brakes which are defective. A reasonable prudent person would recognize that he may be required to stop while driving at a substantial speed. If he could not stop his car within the shorter range of a properly-equipped car, he would be exposing other people traveling on the highway to a greater risk.

The concept of maintaining a safe vehicle is not limited to traveling on the highway. For example, an automobile operator parked his vehicle in the parking lot of a trailer park which was regularly used by pedestrians. A radio antenna of dull texture was bent and extended sideways beyond the fender of the vehicle at approximately eye level. A 15 year old girl playing in the lot ran into the antenna. The court held that the operator should have reasonably foreseen the presence and possible danger of the antenna that could cause injury to others.

The motorist must maintain his vehicle under control at all times. He must be able to avoid collision with pedestrians and other vehicles properly using the highways. This rule requires that the driver keep his car under such control that he can stop within the distance which he can clearly see such distance varying under different conditions. At night the distance would be measured by the range of the driver's headlights. During the day his range of vision would be much greater depending upon the weather conditions. The amount of control which must be exercised will vary depending upon the range of the driver's vision. The extent of the driver's vision will govern the permissible speed and control of the vehicle which must be exercised to slow down or stop.

When applying this rule there are two elements which must be taken into consideration -- visibility and opportunity.

The dangerous condition or object must be large enough or of such a nature to be visible to someone with average eyesight or there must be adequate warning of its existence. For example, if there is construction in progress in a particular area, and everything is clearly marked (signs, blinkers, flares etc.) the motorist is guilty of negligence if he is unable to avoid striking the objects by reducing his speed or stopping his vehicle. The motorist should have seen the object, and did have adequate warning of their distance.

If the motorists vision is impaired or obstructed, he is required to slow down or stop depending upon the condition. For example, if a driver is temporarily blinded by street lights, the headlights of an approaching automobile, or by smoke or dust, he must stop his vehicle and not proceed until his vision is clear. If he should proceed before his vision is clear, he guilty of negligence. Even though it may be negligent for a driver of an automobile to permit the bright lights on his car to obstruct the vision of a driver of another car, the driver of the other vehicle is not relieved of the duty to exercise due care required by the circumstances.

The driver must have had the opportunity to slow down or stop. The driver is not charged with knowledge of ordinary eye sight where he has received no warning of their existence. For example, if a hole in the road is not visible at a greater distance than 5 feet, the motorist will not be deemed to be negligent if he cannot prevent an accident. He is not negligent if he cannot prevent an accident. He is not negligent if he did not have a reasonable opportunity to avoid it. However, the motorist is guilty of negligence if he had an opportunity to slow down or stop and fails to take advantage of that opportunity.

The fact that a driver runs into a car ahead does not establish that the driver was negligent. (It may be very difficult to convince a jury otherwise.)  For example, if a dog jumps outin front of Car A, the driver stopped suddenly to avoid hitting the dog. Car A was then struck in the rear by Car B. Car B in this situation was not negligent since there was no reason to foresee that Car A would stop suddenly to avoid hitting the dog.

The motorist does have the right to assume that others on the highway will exercise car for his safety as well as their own. He can assume that others will obey the rules of the road, the highway regulations and traffic controls. Once it becomes clear however, that the other person will not act with reasonable care he can no longer rely on his assumption. For example, if a motorist sees a vehicle approaching him on the wrong side of the road, he can assume that the driver will return to the other side of the road. It will be a question of fact for the jury to decide how long the motorist can rely upon this assumption. 

The reasonable person will maintain a lookout (1)determine the presence of those who might be on the road and (2) to determine the presence of those whom he realizes will be on the road.

The presence of persons and vehicles should be anticipated at:

The rules of the road, in most jurisdictions, require that the motorist observe and obey all traffic signs. The traffic signs must be (1) lawful and (2) displayed.

For a sign to be lawful it must be erected pursuant to a statute, ordinance or regulation and duly passed by the state. If the erection of a traffic sign is not lawful, the motorist is not bound to obey it.

In addition to the sign being lawful it must be displayed in order to require compliance. The motorist must be able to see the sign. It must be (1) readable and (2) visible.

If the sign is rusted from exposure to the weather and cannot be read or if the sign is not visible because of bushes or trees the motorist is not charged with knowledge of its existence so as to require compliance. If a sign has been knocked down, fallen down or been stolen, it is not displayed. The failure of a motorist to see and comply with a traffic control sign which is lawful and displayed is negligence.

A motorist entering the highway from a private driveway, alley, or garage is required to exercise that degree of care and caution that the hazards of the situation demand. If the entrance to the driveway is obscured from the vision of motorists already on the highway because of the presence of foliage or other obstructions to vision, the care to be exercised is that much greater. The motorist already on the highway is not bound to anticipate that vehicles will enter the highway between intersections. He or she is required to exercise the usual care in having the vehicle under control as to speed and stopping ability. The driver is not held to the same degree of care as would be the case when approaching an intersection. The entering motorist's conduct will be judged by the facts and circumstances of the occurrence, the weather conditions, the densityof traffic, and the kind and type of driveway involved.

The term "pedestrian" is generally understood to be a person who travels on foot. However, if a person is on roller skates or ice skates, it should be kept in mind that his status is that of a pedestrian. It does not change.

The general rule is that all users of the highway have equal rights. This applies whether a motorist or pedestrian is the user. This applies whether a motorist or pedestrian is the user. The rule applies only in the absence of statutes modifying their rights and duties. The motorist and the pedestrian must exercise care and due regard for the corresponding rights of the other. The pedestrian has certain rights and duties when he is:

The pedestrian has the clear statutory right of way. The motorist must yield to this right. If a pedestrian is struck while on the sidewalk there is a presumption of negligence on the operator of the vehicle. It also makes no difference if the wheels of the vehicle are on the road. The motorist is under a duty to drive his vehicle in such a manner that his vehicle or any part of it does not project over the sidewalk.

The pedestrian has a clear right-of-way when crossing on a crosswalk with a green light in his favor. The turning motorist must yield the right-of-way. Should the light change, the motorist must permit the pedestrian to cross before proceeding.

The pedestrian must exercise greater care for his safety in this situation than at a controlled intersection. The pedestrian is on notice of the possible danger and he is required to look before crossing. The pedestrian is not bound to anticipate that a motorist will approach the intersection at a high rate of speed.

The motorist, as such, owes no special duty of care, except to exercise reasonable care. The motorist can assume that the pedestrian will not dart out into his path. The duty of the motoristis governed by whether he saw or should have seen the pedestrian in the road. The motorist can assume that the pedestrian will exercise care for his safety .

The pedestrian is not negligent merely because he crosses the street between intersections. (Exceptions: statute or ordinance prohibiting jaywalking) The pedestrian is required to exercise a greater degree of care and caution. If there is a statute or ordinance which forbids crossing between intersections, the pedestrian is contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

The pedestrian on the open highway is required to walk on the left side of the road and face oncoming traffic. If his failure to do so is the proximate cause of contributing cause of the accident, he will be contributorily negligent.

A child has the same right as any adult or owner of an automobile on the highway. A child is also under a duty to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. However, the child's duty to exercise care is subject to the same variations. The child's age, experience, and ability to apprehend danger will measure the extent of care he is obligated to exercise.

A child under the age of seven (7) is presumed to be incapable of negligence. There are two (2) prevailing views in this regard:

In the second case, evidence can be introduced. It then becomes a jury question as to the child's capability to commit negligence. If a child is seven (7) or older neither presumption is applied.

It is not negligence in itself for a child to play in the street. A child playing in the street is usually charged with knowledge of the danger in using the street as a playground. The child's failure to exercise care for his own safety may constitute contributory negligence.

The care to be exercised by a motorist will vary depending upon the circumstances. If a motorist is passing a school or a playground, he must anticipate the presence of children playing in the street or on the highway. The motorist must exercise more vigilance in this situation than if he were passing through a commercial area. The motorist must realize that the child will not manifest the judgment of an adult. The motorist can not assume that the child in the street will get out of the way. Sounding his horn will not exonerate him from liability if it can be established that the child could not understand or appreciate the warning. The mere fact that a motorist strikes a child does not in and of itself establish negligence on the part of the motorist. The general rule is the younger the child the greater the duty on the part of the motorist.

A passenger is required to exercise reasonable care for his safety. A passenger may not:

The passenger is not required to watch the road and warn the driver of impending dangers.

It is fundamental that, where negligence of the motorist is the proximate cause of an accident, the motorist is answerable. This is true whether there is any contact between the offending vehicle and the injured pedestrian or not. For example, if a motorist drives the car on the sidewalk, and, to avoid being struck, a pedestrian jumps out of the way and is injured in so doing, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the motorist in driving on the sidewalk. While there was no actual contact between the offending vehicle and the pedestrian, nevertheless the motorist is answerable in damages.

In another case, assume that the offending motorist ran through a red traffic light into the path of another vehicle proceeding on the green. The vehicle stops short and there is no contact with the offending vehicle. Because of the sudden stop, vehicles behind are unable to stop and crash into the stopped vehicle. The proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the motorist who ran through the red light, and he or she is liable for all the damage caused thereby, whether to the vehicle into whose path the motorist drove or to the other vehicles which were following. The motorist who stopped suddenly in order to avoid an accident is not to blame for the accident which followed; the responsibility is entirely that of the motorist who ran the red light.

The difficulties attending these no-contact cases do not lie in the direction of the law governing the situation, but in the matter of proof. What usually happens is that the motorist who caused the accident escapes and unidentified. When it is alleged that the motorist who stopped suddenly was negligent, he or she can be absolved of negligence only by showing the necessity for the action. If there was no other vehicle involved, then a sudden stop without warning could be considered a negligent act. Therefore the plaintiffis interested in establishing that there was no other car involved since, in that way, the plaintiff can recover from the defendant. Otherwise, if the defendant was not negligent, and the accident was caused by the other car, which is unidentified, the plaintiff will have to find and identify the other driver before a recovery can be had. Where a defense such as this is interposed, plaintiffs like to refer to the unidentified vehicle as the "phantom car,"which tends to raise some question as to its existence.

Emergency vehicles, for the most part, are police, ambulances and fire apparatus. In many states, statutes regulate the question of liability of the emergency vehicle. Their provisions are variously interpreted in the different states.

Ambulances are subject to the same traffic rules as any other vehicle. They must obey the speed laws, traffic signals, and traffic control signs. In any emergency situation, the ambulance driver can rely on the assumption that all vehicles in the vicinity will yield the right-of-way. The required warning must have been given.

Where statutes confer rights and privileges to ambulances, the ambulance driver must comply with the statute as to the use of a siren, flashing lights, etc. The driver must also be responding to an emergency. It should be established that an emergency existed and its character was such as to justify the speed at which the ambulance was being driven.

Where the statute requires that the motorist torn out of the way of an ambulance, the motorist who fails to do so, after receiving warning of the approach of the ambulance, is chargeable with contributory negligence if an accident should ensue.

The same rules as apply to the ambulances govern the operation of fire apparatus. The driver must sound the proper warning and allow the vehicles on the highway to move out of the way.

The highway and traffic regulations of a state constitute the rules of the road for that particular state. It is impossible for an adjuster to handle automobile claims without having access to the motor vehicle codes for the state in which the accident happened. In all of the respective states, there is a State Motor Vehicle Code book. The code book will list the particular statutes governing the rules of the road.

These codes determine how travelers may use thehighway, which vehicle has the right-of-way, and the conditions under which the right-of-way is acquired, as well as the rights and duties of the vehicles which do not have the superior right-of- way. They also fix the maximum sped and the conditions under which motor vehicles may be driven on the public roads. The rights granted by the rules of the road are not absolute in that they may be exercised underall circumstances; they are subject to the qualification that the motorist exercise care for the safety of others. For example, if a motorist is stopped at a controlled intersection, and the light changes to green in his favor, he must allow the traffic and the pedestrians already in the intersection to clear before he proceeds. Since they are designed to promote safety and to restrict extreme action by any individual, there is a general uniformity among the laws of the various states.

When a motorist is confronted with an emergency, he is required to take such action as a reasonably prudent person would take. This action may involve a violation of the rules of the road.

A violation of the rules of the road will not constitute negligence if the following evidence is available:

This doctrine creates a fictional relationship of principal and agent with regard to the use of a family automobile, whereby the member of the family driving the car is considered to be the agent of the owner, whether there is any agency in fact or not. If an automobile devoted to family purposes is purchased, then any member of the family driving the automobile with the owner's consent is acting as the agent of the owner.

This doctrine is applied even where the member of the family driving the car solely for his or her own purposes. The doctrine is a rule of expediency since it is applied solely for the purpose of permitting an action against a financially responsible person (the owner) rather than limiting the plaintiff to a recourse against another member of the family who may not be able to respond in damages.

Only about half of the states which have considered the doctrine have adopted it, either by specific statute or by judicial determination. The others have specifically rejected the doctrine and refuse to apply it. The purpose of the family purpose doctrine is achieved through compulsory insurance laws. In some states having compulsory insurance laws, it is questionable whether the family purpose doctrine any longer serves a useful purpose.

As one of the conditions of the granting of the privilege to operate a motor vehicle, most states have imposed the condition of a financial responsibility law. These acts generally provide that where the motorist has been involved in an accident for which he is responsible, and for which he is unable to respond in damages, his license to operate a motor vehicle is revokes unless he can furnish proof of future financial responsibility. This proof can take the form of an insurance policy containing the liability limits required by law, or he can qualify as a self-insurer by a deposit of security with the state. When an insurance policy is certified as proof of financial security, the insurance carrier must agree to abide by the conditions of the act as to cancellation and disclaimer. Some acts provide that, if the motorist presents to the state proof that the claim against him has been settled by him, the provisions of the act are not applicable, arid he is not required to file proof of future financial responsibility.

As a means of enforcement, some states require that all drivers submit proof of insurance either concurrently with or within a short time after filing the state motor vehicle report of accident. Forms for this purpose are supplied (usually called SR21's), and the insurance carrier certifies by submission of this form to the state that insurance is carried. This system is the means by which the state can ascertain who is subject to financial responsibility and who is not. If the insurance form is not submitted within the time required by the act, the state assumes that no insurance is carried and that the operator is therefore subject to financial responsibility .The fact that insurance is carried is an indication that the operator can respond in damages if they are awarded, and thus he or she is not subject to the act.

Some states felt that the problem of the financially irresponsible motorist could be solved by compelling all motorists to carry automobile liability insurance with certain minimum limits. Therefore, compulsory insurance laws were passed requiring, as a condition precedent to the renewal of a license, that the motorist present proof of insurance in the form of a policy or certificate from an insurance carrier. Clearly, this type of legislation would requireinsurance on all cars licensed within the state, but it falls short ofthe objective of having insurance available in every case involving an automobile accident. No insurance would be available in the case of a stolen car, an out-of-state vehicle, or an unregistered vehicle.